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Abstract. Cipher-policy attribute-based encryption (CP-ABE) is a more
efficient and flexible encryption system as the encryptor can control the
access structure when encrypting a message. In this paper, we propose a
privacy-preserving decentralized CP-ABE (PPDCP-ABE) scheme where
the central authority is not required, namely each authority can work in-
dependently without the cooperation to initialize the system. Meanwhile,
a user can obtain secret keys from multiple authorities without releasing
his global identifier (GID) and attributes to them. This is contrasted
to the previous privacy-preserving multi-authority ABE (PPMA-ABE)
schemes where a user can obtain secret keys from multiple authorities
with them knowing his attributes and a central authority is required.
However, some sensitive attributes can also release the user’s identity in-
formation. Hence, contemporary PPMA-ABE schemes cannot fully pro-
tect users’ privacy as multiple authorities can cooperate to identifier a
user by collecting and analyzing his attributes. Therefore, it remains
a challenging and important work to construct a PPMA-ABE scheme
where the central authority is not required and both the identifiers and
the attributes are considered.
Key words: CP-ABE, decentralization, privacy
1 Introduction
In network society, users can be identified by their distinct attributes. For exam-
ple, European electronic identity cards often contain the attributes: nationality,
sex, civil status, hair and eye color, and applicable minority status. These at-
tributes are either binary or discrete numbers from a pre-defined finite sets [3].
Especially, they are very privacy-sensitive and require a selective disclosure of
one while hiding others completely; otherwise, a user can be identified and im-
personated by collecting and analyzing his attributes.
In practical applications, we often share data with some expressive attributes
without knowing who will receive it. To resolve this problem, Sahai and Waters
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[30] introduced the seminal concept of attribute-based encryption (ABE). In this
new encryption system, there is a central authority who monitors the universal
attributes and distributes secrete keys to users accordingly. A user can decrypt a
ciphertext if and only if there is a match between the attributes which he holds
and the attributes listed in the ciphertext. Since it can protect the confidentiality
of sensitive data and express flexible access control, ABE schemes have been
focused extensively [2, 11, 14, 26, 19, 31].
To reduce the trust on the central authority, Chase [9] proposed a multi-
authority ABE (MA-ABE) scheme where multiple authorities must cooperate
with the central authority to initialize the system. Then, Lewko and Waters [20]
proposed a new MA-ABE scheme called decentralized CP-ABE (DCP-ABE)
where multiple authorities can work independently without a central authority
or any cooperation among them.
1.1 Privacy in Multi-Authority Attribute-based Encryption
In an MA-ABE scheme, malicious users may combine their secret keys to create
a new secret key if the multiple authorities work independently [9]. For example,
suppose that there is a ciphertext which can be decrypted by the attributes
monitored by the authorities A1 and A2. If Alice obtains secret keys from A1 and
Bob obtains secret keys from A2, they can collaborate to decrypt the ciphertext.
To overcome this hurdle, each user in the system [9] must be designated an unique
global identifier (GID) which is known by each authority. When generating secret
keys for the user, the authorities tie them to his GID.
Privacy issues in MA-ABE are the primary concern of users as the author-
ities can personate the target user if they know his attributes. Some schemes
towards solving this problem have been proposed, but they cannot provide a
complete solution, because, in all these schemes, only the privacy of the GID
has been considered. Currently, there is no any scheme addressing the privacy
issue of the attributes in MA-ABE schemes. However, it is extremely important
as a user can be identified by some sensitive attributes. For example, suppose
that the Head of the Department of Computer Science is Bob. Given two sets
of attributes S1={Position=”Header”, Department=”CS”, Sex=”Male”} and
S2= {Position=”PhD Student”, Department=”CS”, Sex=”Male”}, we can
guess S1 is the attributes of Bob even if we do not know his GID. This clearly
shows that controlled release of sensitive attributes is necessary.
1.2 Our Contributions
In this paper, we propose a privacy-preserving decentralized CP-ABE (PPDCP-
ABE) scheme. In our scheme, any authority can dynamically join or leave the
system, and there is no any requirement for the central authority or interac-
tions among multiple authorities. As a notable feature, each authority can work
independently, while other authorities do not need to change their secret keys
and reinitialize the system when an authority joins or leaves the system. Each
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authority monitors a set of attributes and distributes secret keys to users ac-
cordingly. To resist the collusion attacks, user’s secret keys are tied to his GID.
Especially, a user can obtain secret keys for his attributes from multiple au-
thorities without revealing any information about his GID and attributes to the
authorities. Therefore, it provides stronger privacy compared to the previous
PPMA-ABE schemes where only the identifier is protected. To encrypt a mes-
sage, the encryptor selects an access structure for each authority and encrypts
the message under them so that only the users whose attributes satisfy all the
access structures can decrypt the ciphertext and obtain the plaintext. Compared
to the existing decentralized ABE scheme [20] which was constructed in the ran-
dom oracle model, our scheme is designed in the standard model. To the best
of our knowledge, it is the first PPDCP-ABE scheme where both the identifiers
and attributes are considered.
1.3 Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, the related
work is introduced. We describe the preliminaries which are used throughout
this paper in Section 3. In Section 4, we first construct a DCP-ABE scheme, and
then propose a privacy-preserving key extract algorithm for it. Finally, Section
5 concludes this paper.
2 Related work
In this section, the related work is introduced.
2.1 Attribute-based Encryption
Introduced by Sahai and Waters [30], attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a new
encryption system where both the ciphertext and the secret key are labeled with
a set of attributes. A user can decrypt a ciphertext if and only if there is a match
between the attributes listed in the ciphertext and the attributes held by the
user. Currently, ABE schemes can be classified into two types: key-policy ABE
(KP-ABE) and cipher-policy ABE (CP-ABE).
KP-ABE. In these schemes, an access structure is embedded in the secret keys,
while the ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes [30, 9, 10, 14, 26, 16].
CP-ABE. In these schemes, the secret keys are associated with a set of attributes,
while an access structure is embedded in the ciphertext [2, 11, 18].
In CP-ABE schemes, the encryptor can freely determine the access structure,
while, in KP-ABE schemes, it is decided by the authority.
2.2 Multi-Authority Attribute-based Encryption
In the work [30], Sahai and Waters left an open problem, namely how to con-
struct an ABE scheme where the secret keys can be obtained from multiple
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authorities so that users can reduce the trust on the central authority. Chase
[9] answered this question affirmatively by proposing an MA-ABE scheme. The
technical hurdle in designing an MA-ABE scheme is to resist the collusion at-
tacks. To overcome this hurdle, GID was introduced to tie all the user’s secret
keys together. In [9], there is a central authority, and multiple authorities must
interact to initialize the system.
Based on the distributed key generation (DKG) protocol [13] and the joint
zero secret sharing (JZSS) protocol [12], Lin et al. [22] proposed an MA-ABE
scheme where the cental authority is not required. To initialize the system, the
multiple authorities must cooperatively execute the DKG protocol and the JZSS
protocol twice and k times, respectively, where k is the degree of the polynomial
selected by each authority. Each authority must maintain k+2 secret keys. This
scheme is k-resilient, namely the scheme is secure if and only if the number of
the colluding users is no more than k, and k must be fixed in the setup stage.
Müller et al. [24] proposed a distributed CP-ABE scheme which was proven
to be secure in the generic group [2], instead of reducing to a complexity assump-
tion. Furthermore, a central authority is required to generate the global key and
issue secret keys to users.
Liu et al. [23] proposed a fully secure multi-authority CP-ABE scheme in
the standard model. This scheme was derived from the CP-ABE scheme [19]. In
this scheme, there are multiple central authorities and attribute authorities. The
central authorities issue identity-related keys to users, while the attribute au-
thorities issue attribute-related keys to users. Prior to possessing attribute keys
from the attribute authorities, the user must obtain secret keys from the mul-
tiple central authorities. This MA-ABE scheme was designed in the composite
order (N = p1p2p3) bilinear group.
Lekwo and Waters [20] proposed a new MA-ABE scheme named decentraliz-
ing CP-ABE (DCP-ABE) scheme. This scheme improved the previous MA-ABE
schemes that require collaborations among multiple authorities to conduct the
system setup. In this scheme, no cooperation between the multiple authorities is
required in the setup stage and the key generation stage, and there is no central
authority. Notably, an authority in this scheme can join or leave the system freely
without reinitializing the system. The scheme was constructed in the composite
order (N = p1p2p3) bilinear group, and achieves full (adaptive) security in the
random oracle model. They also pointed out two methods to create a prime
order group variant of their scheme. Nevertheless, the authorities can collect a
user’s attributes by tracing his GID.
Considering the privacy issues in MA-ABE schemes, Chase and Chow pro-
posed [10] a new MA-ABE scheme which improved the previous scheme [9] and
removed the need of a central authority. In previous MA-ABE schemes [9, 22],
to obtain the corresponding secret keys, a user must submit his GID to each au-
thority. So, multiple authorities can cooperate to collect the user’s attributes by
it. In [10], Chase and Chow provided an anonymous key issuing protocol for the
GID where the 2-party secure computing technique is employed. As a result, a
group of authorities cannot cooperate to pool the users attributes by tracing his
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GID. However, the multiple authorities must collaborate to setup the system.
Furthermore, each pair of authorities must execute the 2-party key exchange
protocol to share the seeds of the selected pseudo random functions (PRFs) [25].
This scheme is N − 2 tolerant, namely the scheme is secure if and only if the
number of the corrupted authorities is no more than N−2, where N is the num-
ber of the authorities in the system. Although the authorities cannot know any
information about the user’s GID, they can know the user’s attributes. Chase
and Chow [10] also left an open challenging research problem on how to con-
struct a privacy-preserving MA-ABE scheme without the need of cooperations
among authorities.
Li [21] proposed a multi-authority CP-ABE (MACP-ABE) scheme with ac-
countability, where the anonymous key issuing protocol [10] was employed. In
this scheme, a user can be identified when he shared his secret keys with others.
Notably, the multiple authorities must initialize the system interactively.
Recently, Han et al. [16] proposed a privacy-preserving decentralized KP-
ABE (PPDKP-ABE) scheme. In this scheme, multiple authorities can work in-
dependently without any cooperation. Especially, the central authority is not
required and a user can obtain secret keys from multiple authorities without
releasing anything about his GID to them. Qian et al. [29] proposed a privacy-
preserving decentralized CP-ABE (PPDCP-ABE) scheme which can support
simple access structures. Nevertheless, similar to that in [10], the authorities in
these schemes can know the user’s attributes.
2.3 Anonymous Credential
In an anonymous credential system [7], an identity provider can issue a creden-
tial to a user, which includes the user’s pseudonym and attributes. By using it,
the user can prove in zero knowledge to a third party that he obtains a cre-
dential containing the given pseudonym and attributes without releasing any
other information. In a multiple-show credential system [28], a credential can be
demonstrated an arbitrary number of times, and cannot be linked to each other.
Therefore, in our construction, we assume that each user has obtained an
anonymous credential including his GID and attributes. Then, he can prove in
zero knowledge to the multiple authorities that he has a GID and holds the
corresponding attributes using the anonymous credential technique.
3 Preliminaries
In this section, we introduce the preliminaries used throughout this paper.
In the remainder, by α
$
← A, we denote that α is selected from A randomly.
Especially, α
$
← A stands for that α is selected from A uniformly at random if
A is a finite set. By |A|, we denote the cardinality of a finite set A. A function
ǫ : Z→ R is negligible if for any z ∈ Z there exists a k such that ǫ(x) < 1
xz
when
x > k. By A(x)→ y, we denote that y is computed by running the algorithm A
with input x. KG(1κ) denotes a secret-public key pair generator which takes as
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input a security parameter 1κ and outputs a secret-public key pair. We denote
Zp as a finite field with prime order p. Finally, by R
r
−→ S and R
s
←− S, we denote
that the party R sends r to the party S and the party S sends s to the party R,
respectively.
3.1 Complexity Assumption
Let G and Gτ be two cyclic groups with prime order p, and g be a generator of
G. A map e : G×G→ Gτ is a bilinear group if the following properties can be
satisfied:
1. Bilinearity. For all a, b ∈ Zp and u, v ∈ G, e(ua, vb) = e(ub, va) = e(u, v)ab.
2. Nondegeneracy. e(g, g) 6= 1τ where 1τ is the identity of the group Gτ .
3. Computability. For all u, v ∈ G, there exists an efficient algorithm to compute
e(u, v).
Let GG(1κ) be a bilinear group generator, which takes as input a security
parameter 1κ and outputs a bilinear group (e, p,G,Gτ) with prime order p and
a bilinear map e : G×G→ Gτ .
Definition 1. (q-Strong Diffie-Hellman (q-SDH) Assumption [4]) Let x
$
← Zp,




, · · · , gx
q
), we say that the q-SDH assumption holds on (e, p,G,Gτ)
if no probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can output (c, g
1
x+c ) with the
advantage
AdvA = Pr[A(
−→y )→ (c, g
1
x+c )] ≥ ǫ(k)
where c ∈ Zp and the probability is token over the random choices x
$
← Zp and
the random bits consumed by A.
Definition 2. (Decisional q-Parallel Bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent (q-PBDHE)
Assumption [31]) Let a, s, b1, · · · , bq
$
← Zp, GG(1κ) → (e, p,G,Gτ) and g be a
generator of G. Given a tuple −→y =
g, gs, ga, · · · , g(a
q), g(a




























we say that the decisional q-PBDHE assumption hold on (e, p,G,Gτ) if no
probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A can distinguish (−→y , e(g, g)a
q+1s) from





Pr[A(−→y , e(g, g)a







← Gτ and the probability is token over the random choices of a, s, b1, · · · , bq
$
← Zp and the bits consumed by A.
PPDCP-ABE 7
3.2 Building Blocks
In this paper, the following building blocks are adopted.
Definition 3. (Access Structure [1]) Let P = (P1, P2, · · · , Pn) be n parties. A
collection A ⊆ 2{P1,P2,··· ,Pn} is monotonic if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C, then C ∈ A. An
access structure (respectively monotonic access structure) is a collection (respec-
tively monotonic collection) A of the non-empty subset of (P1, P2, · · · , Pn), i.e.,
A ⊆ 2{P1,P2,··· ,Pn} \ {φ}. A set P is called an authorized set if P ∈ A; otherwise
P is an unauthorized set.
Definition 4. (Linear Secret Sharing Schemes [1]) A secret sharing scheme
∏
over a set of parties P is called linear (over Zp) if it satisfies the following
properties:
1. The shares for each party form a vector over Zp.
2. For
∏
, there is a matrix M with ℓ rows and n columns called the share-
generating matrix. For x = 1, 2, · · · , ℓ, the ith row is labeled by a party
ρ(i) where ρ : {1, 2, · · · , ℓ} → Zp. When we consider the vector
−→v =
(s, v2, · · · , vn), where s ∈ Zp is the secret to be shared and v2, · · · , vn ∈ Zp
are randomly selected, then M−→v is the vector of the ℓ shares according to
∏
. The share Mi
−→v belongs to the party ρ(i), where Mi is the ith row of M .
Linear reconstruction property. Let S be an authorized set and I = {i|ρ(i) ∈ S}.





i∈I ωiλi = s. The constants {ωi}i∈I can be computed
in polynomial time with the size of share-generating matrix M .
Commitment Schemes. A commitment scheme consists of the following algo-
rithms.
Setup(1κ) → params. This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1κ,
and outputs the public parameters params.
Commit(params,m) → (com, decom). This algorithm takes as input the public
parameters params and a message m, and outputs a commitment com and a
decommitment decom. decom can be used to decommit com to m.
Decommit(params,m, com, decom)→ {0, 1}. This algorithm takes as input the
public parameters params, the message m, the commitment com and the de-
commitment decom, and outputs 1 if decom can decommit com to m; otherwise,
it outputs 0.
A commitment scheme should provide two properties: hiding and binding.
The hiding property requires that the message m keeps unreleased until the user
releases it later. The binding property requires that only the value decom can
be used to decommit the commitment com to m.
In this paper, we use the Pedersen commitment scheme [27] which is a per-
fectly hiding commitment scheme and is based on the discrete logarithm as-
sumption. This scheme works as follows. Let G be a cyclic group with prime
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order p, and g0, g1, · · · , gk be generators of G. To commit a tuple of messages
m1,m2, · · · ,mk, the user selects r
$




2 · · · g
mk
k .
Then, the user can use r to decommit the commitment R.
Proof of Knowledge. We use the notion introduced by Camenisch and Stadler
[8] to prove statements about discrete logarithm. By
PoK
{
(α, β, γ) : y = gαhβ ∧ ỹ = g̃αh̃γ
}
,
we denote a zero knowledge proof of knowledge of integers α, β and γ such that
y = gαhβ and ỹ = g̃αh̃γ hold on the group G = 〈g〉 = 〈h〉 and G̃ = 〈g〉 = 〈h〉,
respectively. Conventionally, the values in the parenthesis denote the knowledge
that is being proven, while the rest of the values are known by the verifier. There
exists an extractor that can be used to rewind the knowledge from the successful
prover.
Set-Membership Proof. Camenisch et al. [5] proposed a set membership proof
scheme. This scheme works as follows. Let GG(1κ) → (e, p,G,Gτ), and g, h be
generators of G.
1. The verifier picks up x
$
← Zp, and computes Y = gx and Ti = g
1
x+i for i ∈ Φ,
where Φ ⊆ Zp is a finite set. Then, it sends {Y, (Ti)i∈Φ} to the prover.
2. To prove σ ∈ Φ, the prover selects v, s, t, r, k
$
← Zp, and computes C = gσhr,
D = gshk, V = g
v
x+σ and A = e(V, g)−s · e(g, g)t. Then, it sends (C,D, V,A)
to the verifier.
3. The verifier selects c
$
← Zp, and sends it to the prover.
4. The prover computes zσ = s − cσ, zr = k − cr and zv = t − cv, and sends
(zσ, zk, zt) to the verifier.
5. The verifier verifies D
?
= Ccgzσhzr and A
?
= e(Y, v)c · e(V, g)−zσ · e(g, g)zr .
Theorem 1. This protocol is a zero-knowledge argument of set-membership proof
for a set Φ if the |Φ|-SDH assumption holds on the bilinear group (e, p,G,Gτ)
[5].
3.3 DCP-ABE: Decentralized Cipher-Policy Attribute-based
Encryption
A DCP-ABE scheme consists of the following five algorithms.
Global Setup(1κ)→ params. The global setup algorithm takes as input a security
parameter 1κ, and outputs the public parameter params. Suppose that there
are N authorities {Ă1, Ă2, · · · , ĂN}, and each authority Ăi monitors a set of
attributes Ãi. Each user U has a unique global identifier GIDU and holds a set
of attributes Ũ .
Authority Setup(1κ)→ (SKi, PKi). Each authority Ăi takes as input the security
parameter 1κ, and runs the authority setup algorithm to generate its secret-
public key pair (SKi, PKi), where KG(1
κ)→ (SKi, PKi).
PPDCP-ABE 9
Encrypt(params,M, (Mi, ρi, PKi)i∈I) → CT. The encryption algorithm takes
as input the public parameter params, a messageM, a set of access structures
(Mi, ρi)i∈I and a set of public keys (PKi)i∈I , and outputs the ciphertext CT .




U . Each authority Ăi runs the key
generation algorithm with inputs of the public parameter params, his secret key
SKi, a user’s global identifier GIDU and a set of attributes Ũ
⋂
Ãi to generate
a secret key SKiU for U .
Decrypt(params,GID, (SKiU )i∈I , CT ) → M. The decryption algorithm takes
as input the public parameter params, the user’s globe identifier GIDU , the
secret keys (SKiU )i∈I and the ciphertext CT , and outputs the messageM.









Decrypt(params, Global Setup(1κ)→ params;
GID, (SKiU )i∈I , Authority Setup(1
κ)→ (SKi, Pki);
CT )→M Encrypt(params,M, (Mi, ρi, PKi)i∈I)→ CT ;












where the probability is token over the random bits consumed by all the algorithms
in the scheme.
3.4 Security Model of Decentralized Cipher-Policy Attribute-based
Encryption
We use the following game to define the security model of DCP-ABE schemes,
which is executed between a challenger and an adversary A. This model is called
selective-access structure model, and is similar to that introduced in [9, 10, 16,
20, 31].
Initialization.The adversaryA submits a list of corrupted authoritiesA = {Ăi}i∈I
and a set of access structures A = {M∗i , ρ
∗
i }i∈I∗ , where I ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , N} and
I∗ ⊆ {1, 2, · · · , N}. There should be at lease an access structure (M∗, ρ∗) ∈ A
which cannot be satisfied by the attributes monitored by the authorities in A
and the attributes selected by A to query secrete keys.
Global Setup. The challenger runs the Global Setup algorithm to generate the
public parameters params, and sends them to A.
Authority Setup. There are two cases.
1. For the authority Ăi ⊆ A, the challenger runs the Authority Setup algorithm
to generate the secret-public key pair (SKi, PKi), and sends them to A.
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2. For the authority Ăi * A, the challenger runs the Authority Setup algorithm
to generate the secret-public key pair (SKi, PKi), and sends the public key
PKi to A.
Phase 1. A can query secret key for a user U with an identifier GIDU and a set
of attributes Ũ . The challenger runs the KeyGen algorithm to generate a secret
key SKU , and sends it to A. This query can be made adaptively and repeatedly.
Challenge. A submits two messages M0 and M1 with the same length. The
challenger flips an unbiased coin with {0, 1}, and obtains a bit b ∈ {0, 1}. Then,
the challenger runs Encrypt(parmas,Mb, (M
∗
i , ρ
∗, PKi)i∈I∗) to generate the
challenged ciphertext CT ∗, and sends CT ∗ to A.
Phase 2. Phase 1 is repeated.
Guess. A outputs his guess b′ on b. A wins the game if b′ = b.
Definition 6. (Selective-Access Structure Secure DCP-ABE (IND-sAS-CPA)) A
decentralized cipher-policy attribute-based encryption (DCP-ABE) scheme is (T,
q, ǫ(κ)) secure in the selective-access structure model if no probably polynomial-















where the probability is token over all the bits consumed by the challenger and
the adversary.
3.5 PPDCP-ABE: Privacy-Preserving Decentralized Cipher-policy
Attribute-based Encryption
A PPDCP-ABE has the same algorithms Global Setup, Authority Setup, Encrypt
and Decrypt with the DCP-ABE scheme. The main difference is that we replace
the KeyGen algorithm with a privacy-preserving key generation algorithm PP-
KeyGen. Considering privacy issues, the authorities cannot know both the user’s
identifier and attributes in PPDCP-ABE schemes. This is motivated by the blind
IBE schemes [6, 15]. The PPKeyGen algorithm is formally defined as follows.




Ăi(params, SKi, PKi, comi, (comi,j)ai,j∈
⋂
Ãi
))→ (SKiU , empty). This is an in-
teractive algorithm executed between a user U and an authority Ăi. U runs the
commitment algorithm Commit(params,GIDU )→ (comi, decomi) and






) to the authority Ăi. Then, U and Ăi take as input
(params,GIDU , Ũ , PKi, decomi,(decomi,j)ai,j∈Ũ
⋂
Ãi




), respectively. If Decommit(params,GIDU , comi, dcomi) =
1 and Decommit(params, ai,j , comi,j , decomi,j) = 1, this algorithm outputs a se-
cret key SKiU for U and an empty bit empty for Ăi; otherwise, it outputs (⊥,⊥)
to indicate that there are error messages.
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3.6 Security Model of Privacy-Preserving Decentralized
Cipher-policy Attribute-based Encryption
Now, we define the security of a PPDCP-ABE scheme, which informally is any
IND-sAS-CPA-secure DCP-ABE scheme with a privacy-preserving key extract
algorithm PPKeyGen that satisfies two properties: leak-freeness and selective-
failure blindness. Leak-freeness requires that by executing the algorithm PPKey-
Gen with honest authorities, the malicious user cannot know anything which it
cannot know by executing the algorithm KeyGen with the authorities. Selective-
failure blindness requires that malicious authorities cannot know anything about
the user’s identifier and his attributes, and cause the PPKeyGen algorithm to se-
lectively fail depending on the user’s identifier and his attributes. These two
properties can be formalized by using the following games.
Leak-Freeness. This game is defined by a real world experiment and an ideal
world experiment.
Real World Experiment. Runs the Global Setup algorithm and Authority Setup
algorithm. As many as the distinguisher D wants, the malicious user U chooses
a global identifier GIDU and a set of attributes Ũ , and executes PPKeyGen(









))→ (SKiU , empty) with Ăi.
Ideal World Experiment. Runs the Global Setup algorithm and Authority Setup
algorithm. As many as the distinguisher D wants, the malicious user Ū chooses
a global identifier GIDŪ and a set of attributes
˜̄U , and requires a trusted party







Definition 7. An algorithm PPKeyGen(U ↔ Ăi) associated with a DCP-ABE
scheme
∏
= (GlobalSetup, AuthoritySetup,Encrypt,KeyGen,Decrypt) is leak-free
if for all efficient adversary U , there exists a simulator Ū such that, for the
security parameter 1κ, no distinguisher D can distinguish whether U is playing
in the real world experiment or in the ideal world experiment with non-negligible
advantage.
Selective-Failure Blindness. This game is formalized as follows.
1. The malicious authority Ai outputs his public key PKi and two pairs of
globe identifiers and attribute sets (GIDU0 , Ũ0) and (GIDU1 , Ũ1).
2. A random bit b ∈ {0, 1} is selected.
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5. If SKiUb 6=⊥ and SK
i
U1−b
6=⊥, Ai is given (SK
i
Ub




SKiU1−b =⊥, Ai is given (ǫ,⊥); if SK
i
Ub
=⊥ and SKiU1−b 6=⊥, Ai is given
(⊥, ǫ); if SKiUb =⊥ and SK
i
U1−b
=⊥, Ai is given (⊥,⊥).
6. Ai outputs his guess b
′ on b. Ai wins the game if b
′ = b.
Definition 8. An algorithm PPKeyGen(U ↔ Ăi) associated to a DCP-ABE
scheme
∏
= (Global Setup, Authority Setup, Encrypt,KeyGen,Decrypt) is selective-
failure blind if no probably polynomial-time adversary Ai can win the above game
with the advantage AdvSFBAi =
∣
∣Pr[b′ = b]− 12
∣
∣ > ǫ(κ), where the probability is
token over the bits consumed by all the algorithms and the adversary.
Definition 9. A privacy-preserving decentralized cipher-policy attribute-based
encryption (PPDCP-ABE) scheme ˜
∏
= (Global Setup,Authority Setup,Encrypt,
PPKeyGen,Decrypt) is secure if and only if the following conditions are satisfied:
1.
∏
= (Global Setup,Authority Setup,Encrypt,KeyGen, Decrypt) is a secure
DCP-ABE in the selective-access structures model;
2. the PPKeyGen algorithm is both leak-free and selective-failure blind.
4 Our Constructions
In this session, we first construct a DCP-ABE scheme, and then propose a
privacy-preserving key extract protocol for it.
4.1 DCP-ABE: Decentralized Cipher-policy Attribute-based
Encryption
Overview. Suppose that there areN authorities {Ă1, Ă2, · · · , ĂN} in the scheme,
and each authority Ăi monitors a set of attributes Ãi for i = 1, 2, · · · , N . Ăi
generates his secret-public key pair KG(1κ) → (SKi, PKi). For each attribute
ai,j ∈ Ãi, Ăi chooses a random number zi,j
$
← Zp. Then, the public key is
computed as Zi,j = g
zi,j and the authentication tag is computed as Ti,j =
hzi,jg
1
γi+ai,j where γi is the partial secret key of Ăi. Ti,j can be used to convince
Ăi that the attribute ai,j is monitored by him without revealing it.
To encrypt a messageM under the attributes monitored by the authorities
{Ăj}j∈I , the encryptor selects a random number sj
$
← Zp and an access structure
(Mj , ρj) for each Ăj . Then, it splits sj into shares λj,i according to the LSSS




To resist the collusion attack, when generating a secret key for a user U with
GID µ and a set of attributes Ũ , Ăi chooses two random numbers (tU,i, wU,i)
$
←
Zp. Specifically, tU,i is used to tie the user’s attribute keys to his GID by com-
puting gtU,ig
βi+µ
tU,i where βi is the partial secret key of Ăi, and wU,i is used to
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. Then, Ăi can
generate a secret key for U by using his secret key and (tU,i, wU,i).
To decrypt a ciphertext, each e(g, g)αjsj must be recovered. If the attributes
in Ũ satisfy the access structures (Mj , ρj)j∈I , the user can use his secret keys
and the corresponding ciphertexte elements to reconstruct e(g, g)αjsj , and obtain
M.
Our DCP-ABE scheme is described in Fig.1.
Correctness. Our scheme in Fig. 1 is correct as we have
∏





tU,j , gsj ) =
∏
j∈I e(g, g)
αjsj · e(g, g)xjwU,jsj · e(g, g)tU,jsj · e(g, g)
βjsj











j ) · e(g
1




tU,j , gβjsj ) · e(g
1























































e(Cj,i, Pj) · e(Dj,i, Fρj(i))
)ωj,i
=M.
Theorem 2. Our decentralized cipher-policy attribute-based encryption (DCP-
ABE) is (T, q, ǫ(k)) secure in the selective-access structure model if the (T ′, ǫ′(k))-
decisional q-PBDHE assumption holds on (e, p.G,Gτ), where T ′ = T+O(T ) and
ǫ′(κ) = 12ǫ(κ).
The proof of this theorem is referred to the full version of this paper [17].
4.2 Privacy-Preserving Key Extract Protocol
In this session, we propose a privacy-preserving key extract protocol for the
DCP-ABE scheme described in Fig. 1.
Overview. In Fig. 1, to generate a secret key for a user U , the authority Ăi selects
two random numbers (tU,i, wU,i), and uses them to tie the user’s secret keys to
his GID. If Ăi records (tU,i, wU,i), he can compute g











. Hence, he can know the user’s GID and attributes.
Therefore, in order to protect the privacy of the user’s GID and attributes,
(tU,i, wU,i) should be computed using the 2-party secure computing technique.
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Global Setup. This algorithm takes as input a security parameter 1κ, and outputs a bilin-
ear group GG(1κ)→ (e, p,G,Gτ ). Let g, h and g be generators of the group G. Suppose
that there are N authorities {Ă1, Ă2, · · · , ĂN}, and Ăi monitors a set of attributes
Ãi = {ai,1, ai,2, · · · , ai,qi} where ai,j ∈ Zp for i = 1, 2, · · · , N and j = 1, 2, · · · , qi. The
public parameters are PP = (g, h, g, e, p,G,Gτ ).
Authorities Setup. Each authority Ăi selects αi, xi, βi, γi
$
← Zp, and computes
Hi = e(g, g)
αi , Ai = g
xi , Bi = g
βi , Γ 1i = g
γi and Γ 2i = h
γi , where i =
1, 2, · · · , N . For each attribute ai,j ∈ Ãi, Ă chooses zi,j
$
← Zp, and computes
Zi,j = g
zi,j and Ti,j = h
zi,jg
1
γi+ai,j . Then, Ă publishes the public key PKi =
{




i ), (Ti,j , Zi,j)ai,j∈Ãi
}
, and keeps the master secrete key as SKi =
(αi, ai, βi, γi, (zi,j)ai,j∈Ãi).
Encryption. To encrypt a message M ∈ Gτ , this algorithm works as follows. Let I be
a set which consists of the indexes of the authorities whose attributes are selected to
encryptM. For each j ∈ I, this algorithm first selects an access structures (Mj , ρj) and
a vector −→vj = (sj , vj,2, · · · , vj,nj ), where sj , vj,2, · · · , vj,nj
$
← Zp and Mj is an ℓj × nj
matrix. Then, it computes λj,i = M
i
j
−→v j , where M
i
j is the corresponding ith row of Mj .
Finally, it selects rj,1, rj,2, · · · , rj,ℓj
$




e(g, g)αjsj , {Xj = g
sj , Yj = g








, Dj,1 = g

















KeyGen. To generate secret keys for a user U with GID µ and a set of attributes Ũ
⋂
Ãi,
Ăi selects tU,i, wU,i
$
← Zp, and computes Ki = gαigxiwU,igtU,ig
βi+µ
tU,i , Pi = g
wU,i , Li =
gtU,i , L′i = h
tU,i , Ri = g
1
tU,i , R′i = h
1






The secret keys for U are SKiU =
{









Decryption. To decrypt a ciphertext CT , this algorithm computes
C0 ·
∏







e(Cj,i, Pj) · e(Dj,i, Fρj(i))
)ωj,i
∏
j∈I e(Kj , Xj)
=M
where {ωj,i ∈ Zp}
ℓj
i=1 are a set of constants such that
∑ℓj
i=1 ωj,iλj,i = sj if {λj,i}
ℓj
i=1 are
valid shares of the secret value sj according to the access structure (Mj , ρj).
Fig. 1. Decentralized Cipher-Policy Attribute-based Encryption
First, U chooses (k1, k2, d1, d2)
$
← Zp. It uses (k1, k2) to commit his GID
and (d1, d2) to commit his attributes and the corresponding authentication tags.
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U(PP, PKi, µ, ax ∈ Ũ
⋂
Ãi) Ăi(PP, PKi, SKi)
1. Selects k1, k2, d1, d2
$
← Zp




i , Θ2 = g
du ,
Θ3 = h





i , Θ6 = g
1












computes Υ1 = g
cu , Υ2 = g
1
cu ,
and ΣU = PoK{(k1, k2, d1, du, µ, Υ3 = h
cu , Υ4 = h
1















du ∧Θ3 = h


















ΣAi =PoK{(αi, cu, eu) :










−ax · Υ2 = g
1
cu ∧ Υ3 = h




ax · e(g, g)du)ax∈Ũ
⋂
Ãi














































Fig. 2. PPKeyGen: Privacy-Preserving Key Generation Protocol
Then, U proves in zero knowledge to Ăi that he knows the GID, and the at-
tributes for which he is obtaining secret keys are monitored by Ăi. Ăi checks the
proof. If it fails, Ăi aborts. Otherwise, Ăi chooses (cu, eu)
$
← Zp and generates a
secret key for U by using his secret key, the elements from U and (cu, eu). Fur-
thermore, Ăi proves in zero knowledge that he knows the secret key and (cu, eu);
Finally, U can compute his real secret key by (k1, k2, d1, d2) and the elements
from Ăi.
Actually, by executing the 2-party secure computing protocol, U and Ăi
cooperatively compute wU,i = eud1 and tU,i =
cu
k2
, where (d1, k2) are from U and
(cu, eu) are from Ăi. Therefore, from the view of Ăi, the secret key computed by
U is indistinguishable from the random elements in G.
The privacy-preserving key extract protocol is described in Fig. 2.
Correctness. Let w = d1eu and t =
cu
k2
. The secret keys generated in Fig. 2 are
correct as the following equations hold.











































































Theorem 3. The privacy-preserving key extract protocol in Fig. 2 is both leak-
free and selective-failure blind under the q-SDH assumption, where q = max{q1, q2,
· · · , qN}.
The proof of this theorem is referred to the full version of this paper [17].
By Theorem 2 and Theorem 3, we have the following theorem.
Theorem 4. Our privacy-preserving decentralized cipher-policy attribute-based
encryption (PPDCP-ABE) scheme ˜
∏
= (Global Setup,Authority Setup,Encrypt,
PPKeyGen,Decrypt) is secure in the selective-access structure model under the
decisional q-PBDHE assumption and q-SDH assumption.
5 Conclusion
Decentralized ABE scheme is more efficient and flexible encryption system as it
dose not require a central authority nor the cooperation among multiple author-
ities. Considering to reduce the trust on the authorities, some privacy-preserving
MA-ABE schemes have been proposed. However, in these schemes, only the pri-
vacy of the GID was considered. In this paper, we proposed a PPDCP-ABE
scheme where both the privacy of the GID and the attributes are concerned.
Especially, the user can convince the authorities that the attributes for which he
is obtaining secret keys are monitored by them. Therefore, our scheme provides
a perfect solution for the privacy issues in MA-ABE schemes.
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